Lessons from Benghazi

Lessons from Benghazi: Investigation Leaves Important Questions Unanswered

By Scott G Erickson, Jessica Zuckerman and Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D.
March 12, 2013

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/lessons-from-benghazi-investigation-leaves-important-questions-unanswered

Abstract

The September 11, 2012, attack on the Special Mission compound and annex in Benghazi, Libya, not only resulted in the tragic death of America's first Ambassador killed abroad since 1988, it served as a stark reminder of the myriad dangers facing the nation's diplomatic presence overseas.Following this deadly attack, an Accountability Review Board (ARB) was convened by the U.S. State Department with the task of investigating and reporting on the incident. The ARB's findings, along with other investigations, serve as an indictment of the State Department's unpreparedness before the Benghazi attack, and suggest a need for greater communication and transparency in preparing for, and anticipating, future dangers. Key questions remain and necessitate answers in order to better protect U.S. diplomatic facilities, and the people who serve in them, in the future.

When armed terrorists stormed the United States Special Mission compound in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, it was not the first such breach of a U.S. diplomatic installation. In fact, it was one of four such attacks that occurred over the course of the week in Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya.

This recent spate of violence underscored the often tenuous relationship that exists between evolving power structures in the Middle East, as exemplified by the Arab Spring and subsequent regime changes in Egypt and Libya, as well as the sometimes precarious security of America’s diplomatic presence abroad. This phenomenon, however, is nothing new; nor is it relegated to the Middle East. Several significant acts of terror have occurred over the past 50 years, which have resulted in the deaths of American citizens deployed abroad.

Given this history of violence, questions arise about whether lessons should have been learned that could have led to more appropriate action prior to the Benghazi attack. Questions also arise about the scope and nature of the information received by the State Department and White House before the onset of violence in Benghazi, and to what extent that information should have inspired a different course of action. Despite Congress’s efforts to investigate the events surrounding the attack, these and other key concerns remain unanswered. Fully understanding what and who was behind the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi is vital to preparing for future security threats to American embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions.

To ensure that the remaining questions are answered, Congress should establish a select committee, preferably bicameral, to examine the details of the attack and determine how to improve U.S. diplomatic security. At the same time, in order to address future diplomatic security, Congress and the Administration should:

Recognize the true nature and scope of the Islamist terrorist threat,

Conduct frequent and extensive threat assessments for diplomatic facilities abroad,

Combat stovepiping in addressing diplomatic security and ensure a comprehensive government response, and

Require that the investigations result in meaningful legislative and executive branch follow-up.

History of Violence Toward U.S. Diplomatic Facilities

During the second half of the 20th century, there were at least 40 major security breaches and attacks against U.S. diplomatic installations throughout the world[1] In 1968, Viet Cong fighters stormed the U.S. embassy in Vietnam and engaged in a firefight with U.S. Marines. After nearly nine hours of fighting the embassy was secured; however, the attack unnerved the United States, whose presence in the region had begun only two years earlier[2]

More infamously, the Iranian Hostage Crisis commenced on November 4, 1979, setting off a diplomatic and national security stalemate that lasted for 444 days. In the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, hundreds of students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, took over 50 Americans as hostages and effectively severed U.S. and Iranian diplomatic relations. The hostage crisis came to an end only on January 20, 1981, following the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan[3]

More recently, in 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed in near-simultaneous attacks that resulted in 223 deaths and over 4,000 injuries. The attacks were led by al-Qaeda, introducing the terror organization and its leader Osama bin Laden into the American lexicon[4]

On the same day as the attack in Libya, September 11, 2012, an angry mob in Egypt climbed onto the U.S. embassy compound in Cairo and tore down the American flag, resulting in a confrontation with security personnel in which 13 people were injured[5] Less than two days later, hundreds of demonstrators also stormed the gates of the U.S. embassy in Yemen, smashing windows of the embassy building and burning cars. Fifteen people were injured before security personnel were able to contain the situation[6]

As violence erupted in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, similar uprisings began to foment throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In Kuwait, nearly 200 demonstrators gathered outside the U.S. embassy chanting anti-American slogans[7] Protests formed around the U.S. diplomatic presence in Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan; protestors in Bangladesh and Iran took to the streets in similar fashion. Even more recently, and unrelated to the pattern of violence last fall, a suicide bomber at the U.S. embassy in Turkey left one dead and one wounded when he detonated his bomb at the security checkpoint[8]

Unfortunately these incidents represent only a fraction of the nearly four dozen known and significant acts of violence and aggression that have been directed toward U.S. embassies, consulates, and consular personnel over the past 50 years.

Libya, Pre-Attack

In late 2010, popular uprisings across North Africa emerged in protest to the region’s oppressive autocrats. By February 2011, the Arab Spring reached Libya where the opposition sought the removal of dictator Muammar Qadhafi, who had ruled for over 40 years. With support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Gulf States, the opposition advanced from Benghazi toward the capital city, Tripoli. On October 20, 2011, rebels captured and killed Qadhafi outside his hometown of Siirte.

Since the regime fell, Libya has struggled to restore stability. It took nine months after Qadhafi’s death for the opposition’s political body, the National Transitional Council (NTC), to hold elections. Despite electing a national congress and a president, the government has failed to unify the country. Armed militias have rebuffed attempts by the government to integrate them with the Libyan military, and extremist groups are active throughout the country. In particular, the report by the Accountability Review Board, convened by the Department of State, details incidents demonstrating the dangerous circumstances in which American diplomats were operating in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya. These include armed robberies, attacks on U.S. and international diplomatic personnel as well as on nongovernmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross[9]

Furthermore, during the civil war, the regime’s arms warehouses were bombed and looted and their contents proliferated throughout the region. Tanks, machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades are just a few of the thousands of weapons that authorities have reclaimed. While the United States, NATO allies, and Libyan authorities have had a degree of success in tracking down some munitions, large numbers are still missing. These include thousands of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), demonstrated to be capable of downing commercial jetliners[10]

Fallout has not been limited to Libya. Immediately after Qadhafi’s death, well-armed Tuareg fighters, once loyal to the regime, returned to their homeland in Niger and Mali. Those that returned to Mali joined the ranks of the separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which was already engaged in fighting the Malian army. This set off a chain of events that contributed to a military coup and the occupation of northern Mali by a coalition of Islamist terrorist groups[11 ]

It is evident that there was a clear and present security threat against U.S. interests in Benghazi.

Ultimately, the inability of Libya’s fledgling government to implement law and order has contributed to insecurity throughout the region. Considering the violent conditions on the ground, it is evident that there was a clear and present security threat against U.S. interests in Benghazi, although no specific threat of attack on the Special Mission had been cited by U.S. intelligence. Nevertheless, despite the lack of intelligence on September 11, 2012, this threat quickly became reality when armed terrorists descended on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. In doing so, the attackers perpetrated an act of terror that claimed the life of the first American Ambassador murdered since 1988.

The Benghazi Attack

Early in the evening of September 11, 2012, Ambassador Christopher Stevens ended a meeting with the Turkish consul general and concluded his workday. Shortly thereafter, just before 9:45 p.m., a mob descended upon the Special Mission compound[12] The consulate building, surrounded on three sides by orchards and a soccer field, was quickly overwhelmed[13]

The compound was guarded by four unarmed members of the local guard group, the Blue Mountain Libya (BML); three armed members of the local militia, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade; and five U.S. diplomatic security (DS) officers. When the attack began, the February 17 Brigade members and the BML guards fled without raising the alarm. The DS officers, on the other hand, immediately raised the alarm, alerted the nearby CIA annex and the embassy in Tripoli, and went into action, trying to get the Ambassador and other personnel to safety[14]

By 10 p.m. the compound building was engulfed in flames. One DS officer was with Ambassador Stevens and foreign service officer Sean Smith in the “safe area” within the compound. When the smoke became overwhelming, the DS officer attempted to lead them out of the building through a window, but was separated from them in the smoke and chaos. Later, the other DS officers and the annex security team located Smith’s body. All attempts to locate the Ambassador were unsuccessful. All other American personnel retreated to the nearby annex[ 15]

At approximately 11:15 p.m. an unmanned aerial surveillance vehicle, diverted from another mission by the Department of Defense, reached the facility in Benghazi. After midnight, looters pulled the unresponsive body of Ambassador Stevens from the burning Special Mission building. The Ambassador’s body was brought to the nearby Benghazi Medical Center where he was attended to as an unidentified patient. He was declared dead at approximately 2:00 a.m[16]

Around 5:00 a.m. intense fighting again resumed, now at the nearby CIA annex where diplomatic personnel had holed up. American security forces, joined by recently arrived personnel from the embassy in Tripoli, engaged the terrorists in a ferocious firefight that claimed the lives of DS officers Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, both former Navy SEALs[17]

Fighting continued for several more hours before the first flight carrying American consular personnel left Benghazi between 7:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. Around 8:30 a.m., Ambassador Stevens’s body was brought from the hospital to the airport via ambulance. One of the DS officers that had been at the compound positively identified the body. By 10:00 a.m. the final flight carrying the last remaining Americans, including Ambassador Stevens’s body, left Benghazi, drawing the evening to its tragic conclusion[18]

The Investigation

On September 20, 2012, less than 10 days after the deadly Benghazi attack, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to investigate and report on the attack in Benghazi. Clinton’s authority to convene such an inquiry stemmed from the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986[19]

The omnibus bill, itself an outgrowth of a myriad of diplomatic security breaches and embassy attacks, stipulated that “[a] Board shall consist of five members, 4 appointed by the Secretary of State, 1 appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.”[20] Such a board would be charged with responsibility for examining the “facts and circumstances surrounding the serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or related to a United States Government mission abroad.”[21]

Similarly, the Senate’s Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC) produced a report analyzing the conditions and actions that precipitated the Benghazi attack on September 11. Nearly three months after both investigations were initiated, the ARB and HSGAC issued their public findings, on December 18, 2012, and December 31, 2012, respectively[22]

The ARB, chaired by former Ambassador Thomas Pickering and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, as well as the HSGAC, issued a number of critical findings. These include:

Security Gaps. Per international standards, a host nation is generally recognized to be responsible for helping to maintain the security of other nations’ diplomatic facilities within its borders. In Libya, however, the turmoil that followed the fall of the Qadhafi regime left the country without a strong central authority. More than a year later, Libya’s National Transitional Council is still struggling to restore stability. According to the HSGAC report, the State Department failed to augment the compound with additional security staff, despite being fully aware of the Libyan government’s inability to adequately provide security for the Mission in Benghazi. It was within the context of a recognizably deficient Libyan government support system that the United States relied heavily on local, indigenous security, namely the February 17 Brigade and Blue Mountain Libya.

The reliance of the State Department on such local security groups, however, remains unnerving given their lack of skill, obstinacy, and near-abdication of duties following a dispute over salaries and working conditions prior to the September 11, 2012, attacks. According to the ARB:

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks…. At the time of Ambassador Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest [over salary and working hours]. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled[23]

Indeed, the ARB indicated that it found little evidence that the February 17 Brigade and BML provided meaningful assistance in securing the facility in Benghazi during the attack.

The State Department failed to augment the Benghazi compound with additional security staff, despite being fully aware of the Libyan government’s inability to adequately provide security.

Also complicating security efforts in Benghazi was the fact that the Special Mission remained a temporary facility, the impact of which is twofold. First, personnel were stationed at the Special Mission for short periods of time. This made it difficult to develop consistent security protocols, and it also meant that no personnel were there long enough to become experienced in their roles. Second, there was a great deal of ambiguity surrounding security funding and resource decisions. Indeed, according to the HSGAC report, “Because the Benghazi facility was temporary, no security standards applied to it.”[24]This included the provision of physical security measures and barriers at the facility.

Leadership Failures. Ultimately, the ARB found that responsibility for the gaps in security in Benghazi rested in part on “[s]ystemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department.”[25] The lack of preparation and adequate staffing likely resulted from an inchoate sense of where ultimate authority rested in making final decisions related to security staffing needs. The ARB concluded that among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi, “[t]here appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.”[26]

At the same time, security decisions appear to have been stovepiped, rather than being viewed as a “shared responsibility” among the appropriate actors in Washington[27] Greater cooperation appears to be needed between the intelligence community, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense to protect American diplomatic facilities in the future. Indeed, in Benghazi, Defense Department–support decisions may have been hindered by the lack of shared information and operational awareness between the Defense and State Departments. The Defense Department’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) was responsible for working with the State Department in developing security assessments and evacuation plans. However, it appears that the State Department did not know how long it would take the Defense Department to respond in the event of a crisis, nor did the Defense Department seem to know how many individuals were present at the Benghazi facility—which is important to know in the event of an evacuation[28]

Intelligence Deficiencies. Addressing the intelligence gaps that preceded the attack, the Accountability Review Board found a discontinuity in the understanding, and anticipation, of terrorist activity at or near the Special Mission compound in Benghazi. “Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist,” the ARB concluded.

Similarly, the HSGAC report concluded that the lack of specific intelligence warnings may have partially stemmed from the narrow focus of the intelligence community in Libya on al-Qaeda and its known affiliates: “[T]he activities of local terrorist and Islamist extremist groups in Libya may have received insufficient attention from the IC [intelligence community] prior to the attack, partially because some of the groups possessed ambiguous operational ties to core al-Qaeda and its primary affiliates.”[29] This finding seems particularly relevant given that the local extremist group that has claimed responsibility for the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia Libya, is neither directly tied to al-Qaeda nor a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization.

The ARB concluded that amongst Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi, “[t]here appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.”

Ultimately, both the ARB and HSGAC cautioned against an over-reliance on “warning intelligence” in preparation for the onset of violence at high-risk, high-threat diplomatic missions[30] Instead, the State Department should increase its awareness of the wide array of other factors that could alert it to any rapid or ongoing deterioration of regions in which a mission is operating. Indeed, a wealth of information existed prior to the attack indicating that the security situation in Benghazi was deteriorating. This information could have been used by State Department officials to inform security needs at the Special Mission facility. Unfortunately, this reactionary mentality seems to be par for the course, as the Administration continues to broadly treat terrorism under a law enforcement paradigm that focuses on response-oriented policies and prosecuting terrorists. This approach takes the place of proactive efforts to enhance intelligence tools and thwart terrorist attacks long before the public is in danger[31]

Secretary Clinton’s Testimony

On January 23, 2013, after the release of each report’s respective findings, Secretary Clinton testified before Congress[32] Her testimony offered few answers to the questions that remained. Clinton attempted to place the Benghazi attack within the historical context of violence against diplomatic missions and seemed to convey a sense of incredulity at the public nature of Congress’s inquiry. “This committee never had a public hearing about the 17 other ARBs because they’re classified,” Clinton stated[33] Of the 19 ARBs convened since 1988, only two unclassified versions have been released[34]

The now former Secretary of State, while openly taking responsibility for the September 11, 2012, attack, downplayed the extent to which she was personally aware of the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi as well as the formal requests for additional security. Clinton testified that those security requests were handled by security professionals and did not reach her desk. Unfortunately, this equivocation does not indicate that Clinton’s office fully acknowledged its own failures in understanding and reacting to the evolving threat situation in Benghazi.

In one of the most contentious moments of her testimony, Secretary Clinton reacted angrily to questions posed by Senator Ron Johnson (R–WI) concerning the nature and origins of the Benghazi attacks by declaring:

With all due respect, the fact is we had four dead Americans. Was it because of a protest or was it because of guys out for a walk one night, [who] decided to go kill some Americans? What difference at this point does it make? It is our job to figure out what happened and do everything we can to prevent it from ever happening again, Senator[35]

The differences, of course, between a coordinated terrorist attack, a planned protest, or an impromptu event spurred by “guys out for a walk” are manifold. Secretary Clinton’s argument lacked resonance because the advent of a coordinated terrorist attack could have been prevented through improved intelligence-gathering mechanisms and concurrent increases in security, a scenario far less conceivable in the face of a spontaneous riot.

Unanswered Questions Remain

The ARB and HSGAC report articulated several areas where the State Department failed to properly anticipate and implement adequate security measures to protect diplomatic personnel in Libya. However, there remained glaring omissions within the reports. Many had hoped that Secretary Clinton’s testimony would shed greater light on the circumstances surrounding the Benghazi attack before its culmination and address many of these omissions. Yet, several key questions remain unanswered, including:

Which counterterrorism and early-warning measures were in place to address security threats? To learn how to prevent future attacks against U.S. overseas facilities, it is necessary to know what counterterrorism efforts, if any, were in place to reduce the threat of an attack in the first place. Open-source documents reveal that eastern Libya has long been a hotbed of instability and that U.S. facilities in Libya were operating under high-risk conditions. More analysis and information is needed to determine which procedures were followed to identify and disrupt terrorist operations aimed at diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Which risk assessments were performed and which risk-mitigation measures were adopted before the attack? Since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime, Libya’s fledgling government has been unable to stem the influence of extremist entities. The instability on the ground therefore created an apparent risk to U.S. personnel. Risk assessments that evaluate threats, criticality, and vulnerability are needed. Then, the most prudent combination of risk-mitigation measures can be adopted. Together, these methods are a proven strategy for enhancing physical security.

What kind of contingency planning was undertaken and exercised to respond to armed assaults against U.S. facilities in Benghazi? Early-warning planning and risk assessments are essential to countering threats against U.S. personnel and facilities, but they have their limits. Incomplete data and inaccurate judgments are challenges that could result in unforeseen consequences. Contingency planning must be flexible and adaptable in order to ensure an adequate response to security threats. To fully assess the Administration’s response to the Benghazi attack, any future investigating committee would need to know which contingency plans were in place, how developed they were, and to what extent they were implemented.

How was the interagency response to the incident organized and managed? When a crisis puts the lives of U.S. personnel and U.S. interests at risk, the whole of government should respond with all reasonably available resources. Future investigations should address the command, control, and coordination of efforts to organize and integrate interagency responses after a threat becomes evident.

Clinton’s testimony aside, understanding the level of requests for additional security, or warnings of worsening conditions on the ground, that reached within the State Department, is crucial. This understanding naturally leads to questions regarding how deeply the State Department and White House have communicated on this issue.

In the immediate aftermath and weeks following the Benghazi attacks, the White House promoted a narrative centered on the notion that an impromptu demonstration against a crudely made YouTube video insulting the prophet Mohammed unraveled into the chaos and violence that engulfed the mission in Benghazi. Although the investigation is still ongoing, evidence suggests that officials at the State Department and White House believed within hours of the Benghazi incident that this was not the case. Instead, they believed it was an attack coordinated by al-Qaeda and the Libyan group Ansar al-Sharia.

Given the conflicting narrative produced by the Obama Administration, there are two possible explanations. One possibility is that officials within the White House were uninformed, meaning communication with the State Department was woefully lacking. The other is that individuals within the White House consciously and deliberately promoted a public explanation of the Benghazi attack that was at odds with reality.

Vulnerabilities Found by Government Investigators

Long before the Benghazi attack, in November 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report detailing U.S. diplomatic security challenges. The report found three specific areas of concern: (1) a greater number of missions in dangerous locations; (2) insufficient and inexperienced staffing and inadequate building security, and (3) a lack of strategic planning in diplomatic security.

According to the GAO report, maintaining missions in increasingly dangerous locations had stretched the State Department’s ability to provide adequate security. The GAO found that the State Department was maintaining missions where it previously would have evacuated personnel or closed the post. Missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other unstable nations required “unprecedented amounts of security resources.”[36] For example, diplomatic security agents in Afghanistan and Iraq reported that safely transporting diplomatic officials was their greatest challenge due to the assets required. These include armored vehicles, contractors to maintain equipment in rough terrain, and in some cases an air wing for transportation, surveillance, and search and rescue operations[37]

The GAO found that the State Department was maintaining missions where it previously would have evacuated personnel or closed the post.

The GAO also found serious challenges with security staffing and maintaining adequate building security. In 2008, around one-third of the State Department’s domestic security offices operated with a vacancy rate of 25 percent or higher, with some offices operating at as low as 35 percent capacity[38] When GAO staffers visited three posts overseas, for example, they found that the Regional Security Office in Abuja, Nigeria, had only one of four assigned security staff members while the office in New Delhi “had only two of its seven allocated special agents until fall of 2008.”

While the State Department tried to hire more special agents, it takes three or more years to train these agents, even after the State Department condensed agent training. Unfortunately, the pressing need for agents ultimately led to 34 percent of security positions being “filled with officer below the positions grade,” with such experience gaps threatening to compromise diplomatic security[39] The GAO also found that “many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack” due to a failure to meet embassy security standards[40]

Lastly, diplomatic security growth has been reactive, not strategic. While security will always be partially reactive, planning ahead is critical to ensure that staffing and resource priorities are met. The GAO found:

Past efforts to further plan Diplomatic Security resources have gone unheeded. Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan for fiscal year 2006 (written in 2005) identified a need to (1) develop a workforce strategy to recruit and sustain a diverse and highly skilled security personnel base and (2) to establish a training float to address recurring staffing problems. As of September 2009, Diplomatic Security had not addressed either of those needs[41]

Many of these gaps still remain today.

In a hearing on November 15, 2012, the GAO stated that it had found that the State Department still “needs to take action in order to strategically assess the competing demands on Diplomatic Security and the resulting mission implications.”[42] Failure to remedy these concerns led to serious diplomatic security vulnerabilities at posts throughout the world, and will continue to do so unless they are addressed.

The Future of Diplomatic Security

The attack in Benghazi and the most recent attack in Turkey on February 1 represent only the latest incidents in which the security of U.S. diplomatic missions was breached. The tragic loss of life that resulted from these incidents should not serve simply as a reminder of the many dangers facing U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. They should also act as a clarion call for improving the standards by which diplomatic security is assessed and implemented.

The U.S. State Department currently manages more than 200 posts throughout the world[43] Most of these diplomatic installations require unremarkable security needs. However, many of the United States’ most sensitive diplomatic missions operate in tenuous security environments. It is in these areas that one most often finds the need for enhanced security measures.

The findings from the ARB and HSGAC reports, and the fact that many of the most important questions failed to receive adequate scrutiny, should motivate action. Congress and the Administration should take the following steps to anticipate and mitigate the omnipresent threats facing the nation’s diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad:

Establish a Congressional Select Committee to find answers to remaining questions. Questions still remain after the release of the ARB and HSGAC reports, along with the related committee hearings, briefings, and letters to Administration officials. These various investigations have not only failed to provide complete answers to some of the crucial questions on embassy security and the events of September 11, 2012, but have at times resulted in contrasting and confusing accounts. There is historical precedent for the formation of congressional select committees in the aftermath of similar security crises—such as the Senate’s Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities in response to the Watergate scandal, and the joint congressional committee that was established to investigate the Iran–Contra affair. Such a committee would not only help to provide answers to the remaining questions surrounding the attack, but would enable the relevant congressional committees to work together to ensure the future safety of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad.

Recognize the true nature and scope of the Islamist terrorist threat. Time and time again the Administration has failed to recognize the true threat posed by Islamist extremism. In the days immediately following the attack in Benghazi, the Administration failed to identify the assault as an act of terrorism, instead publicly subscribing to the belief that the attacks were born of a spontaneous riot. Not only does this show that the Administration may have failed to appropriately connect the dots following the attack, but also that it is continues to fail to grasp the ideological motivations of Islamist terrorists. So, too, it appears that the intelligence community may have failed to identify warnings of the attack due to its narrow focus largely on al-Qaeda and its affiliates, excluding groups not directly affiliated with al-Qaeda. In order to better protect U.S. interests in the future, both the Administration and the intelligence community must recognize that while Osama Bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other Islamist extremists continue to actively plot to harm the United States, its interests, and its citizens.

Conduct frequent and extensive threat assessments for diplomatic facilities. Such assessments should be made for any and all potential dangers, both anticipated and unanticipated, that could confront any diplomatic mission—especially those operating in high-threat environments. These threat assessments should include input from numerous agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Department, and the State Department itself. The assessments should also include regular briefings reaching the highest levels of both Congress and the White House. As the ARB report highlighted, simply relying on “warning intelligence” is not enough. Risk assessments that evaluate threats, criticality, and vulnerability, along with a frank assessment of mission priorities, risks, and costs, should be conducted on a regular basis and used to inform security decisions and resource allocations.

Combat stovepiping in addressing diplomatic security and ensure whole of government response. As previously stated, when a crisis puts the lives of U.S. personnel and U.S. interests at risk, the whole of government should respond with all reasonably available resources. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has testified that there was not enough time to get armed assets to Benghazi to aid in fending off the attack. Nevertheless, investigations have also indicated that coordination between the Defense and State Departments on matters of security were lacking. Similarly, while enough evidence existed to suggest that the security situation in Benghazi was deteriorating, it was not used to inform strategic decisions. This also suggests a serious failure in communication and coordination. As the ARB report asserted, security in Benghazi was not recognized as a “shared responsibility” across the whole of government. This must change. Greater effort is needed to combat such stove-piping in addressing diplomatic security and ensure a government response to not only ensure that other nation’s diplomatic facilities are secure, but also to allow a swift response in the face of threats.

Assign a permanent Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Mediterranean. As Libya and many other Northern African nations remain politically unstable, it is necessary for the U.S. to deploy more robust, mobile, and flexible security forces in the region. The U.S. Marine Corps should therefore permanently assign a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the Mediterranean to provide this capability. An MEU consists of roughly 2,200 Marines, three Navy amphibious assault vessels, a rapidly deployable infantry battalion, and various aviation assets. Because an MEU operates from Navy vessels, it can deploy relatively large forces to a point of conflict rapidly, while not having the diplomatic concerns of establishing a temporary base on foreign soil. A permanent MEU presence in the Mediterranean will also enable a robust force to evacuate U.S. officials and citizens from an area of tumult quickly and with reduced risk of harm.

Require that the investigations result in meaningful legislative and executive branch follow-up. Too often, security breakdowns are reported and recorded, and the recommendations are never implemented. Congress should enact legislation that requires the State Department to submit a follow-up report on Benghazi within a year specifically addressing the progress made on implementing the recommendations. It should also press the State Department to implement the recommendations issued by the GAO.

Ensuring that Lessons Are Learned

The tragedy that took place in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, shocked and saddened the United States. Both the State Department and the Senate tried to figure out what went wrong, in hopes of ensuring that such a tragedy would not happen again. The State Department’s Accountability Review Board and the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee released unclassified versions of their findings. While many important issues were addressed, there remain glaring omissions that still need to be addressed. In order to better protect U.S. diplomatic facilities, these questions must be answered and a more focused and effective holistic government approach created from the lessons demonstrated by this possibly avoidable disaster.

—Scott G. Erickson is a police officer in California; his focus is on identifying terrorist organizations. Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Steven P. Bucci, PhD, is Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The authors wish to thank Allison Center intern Sarah Friesen for her help in preparing this paper.

Fight Terror by Educating Women

Want to fight terrorism? Educate women

Giving women the autonomy to decide when to marry and when to have children would help bring stability to Africa's Sahel region.

By Prof Malcolm Potts | 25 January 2013
Los Angeles Times

http://churchandstate.org.uk/2013/01/want-to-fight-terrorism-educate-women/ - .UT9dp7lOG2U.facebook

The jihadists stoning women to death in Mali and taking hostages in Algeria are harbingers of much worse to come. Osama bin Laden may be dead, but Al Qaeda in Africa now threatens an area twice the size of Germany.

Mali is just one country in the Sahel, a million square miles of arid and semi-arid countryside stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. The region has always been subject to episodes of starvation and brutal tribal conflicts, and things are now deteriorating further.

Many of the region’s problems today can be traced back 20 years, to a decision by the United Nations and other international organizations to shift their focus away from family planning, which we know to be an extremely effective way to empower women and stretch scarce resources.

Since then, a variety of agencies have proclaimed their commitment to women’s rights, but nothing concrete has been done to change the atrocious treatment of women in places like the Sahel. Girls as young as 10 are married to 40-year-old polygamous men. The obscenity of female genital mutilation is widespread. Women do much of the work, often walking 10 miles a day to collect water. Most are illiterate: In Niger, for example, only one girl in 1,000 completes secondary school.

Twenty years ago in Mali there were 6 million people. Today, there are 16 million, and that number is expected to grow to more than 35 million by 2050. Could that be one reason why Al Qaeda now controls half the country? The 9/11 Commission investigating the Al Qaeda attacks on America 12 years ago called a rapidly increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of employment “a sure prescription for social turbulence.”

The population of the Sahel as a whole will have increased more than tenfold in a single century, from 31 million people in 1950 to 340 million by 2050. Even with good governance (which the Sahel lacks), it is impossible to provide educational and employment opportunities for populations growing at this rate. As the 9/11 Commission report foresaw, social turbulence in the Sahel is turning into whirlwind of violence.

On top of this already daunting catalog of problems, climatologists at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory project that temperatures in the Sahel will rise by an additional 7 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit by 2050. Crops will wither and livestock will die even as the population continues its rise. The crisis unfolding in the Sahel could become a cataclysm affecting 200 million people.

Without radical new policies, we can be certain that there will be more conflicts, more failed states and more easy pickings for Islamic fundamentalists. The only genuine path to peace in the Sahel is by investing in women. It will be a long, difficult process, but it is not impossible if we start today and on a realistic scale. As a result of the failure to invest in family planning for 20 years, only 8% of women in Mali use contraception.

It doesn’t have to be that way. The Bixby Center for Population, Health and Sustainability at UC Berkeley has been working with Nigerian colleagues in a group of villages near the northern border with Niger. We found that the average girl there was married at 14 and had given birth to two children by age 18. Almost none entered secondary school, much less completed it. In a tiny but highly successful project, working closely with communities, we were able to keep 205 out of 230 girls in secondary school. Only three of those who remained in school married before graduating, and only one had a child. The cost of the program was less than $40 per girl annually.

It will take 20 years and billions of dollars to bring projects such as this to scale, but there is no other plausible way to bring stability to the region.

The U.S. military has spent $620 million training local armies in counter-terrorism tactics in the Sahel. But that money hasn’t bought the loyalty of testosterone-filled, volatile young men. The $620 million is actually proving counterproductive, as some of those who were trained used their new skills to overthrow their own government, while others built links with the hostage-takers in Algeria. The $620 million would have been better spent helping to give women the autonomy to decide when to marry and when to have children.

As a nation we spend almost $2 billion a day on defense. According to economist Joseph Stiglitz, the Afghan and Iraq wars will cost us a mind-boggling $3 trillion. And both wars have so far failed to create stable countries. One reason may be that both Afghanistan and Iraq are high-fertility, patriarchal societies, and our intervention did almost nothing to help women.

It’s not that we don’t need an army, and boots on the ground may sometimes be necessary. But the war or terror will continue to fail unless we convert a few days’ military expenditure into investing in girls’ education and family planning in the Sahel and elsewhere.

Malcolm Potts is a Cambridge trained obstetrician and reproductive scientist. He is the first holder of the Fred H. Bixby endowed chair in Population and Family Planning in the School of Public Health, Berkeley. As CEO of Family Health International (FHI), he launched the first large scale studies of maternal mortality, which helped start the worldwide Safe Motherhood Initiative. He has published ten books and over 200 scientific papers. His recent books include Queen Victoria’s Gene and Ever Since Adam and Eve: The Evolution of Human Sexuality. His most recent book is Sex and War: How Biology Explains War and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World​​​​​​.

Homemade Alcohol Kills in Libya

Homemade Alcohol Kills More than 41 in Libya
12/03/2013 02:06:00

http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=9984

Libyan Ministry Health announced Monday that 41 people have died as a result of drinking homemade alcohol that contained poisonous methanol. The death toll is expected to rise.

The ministry counted 378 cases of poisonous methanol victims.

Another statement released by the Directorate of National Security of Tripoli also said on Monday that Tripoli hospitals received 428 poisoned cases 19 of which had died.

The 19 dead people in this statement could be also mentioned in the release by the Ministry of Health on the same day.

Among the dead are Tunisians and Algerians. Some of the victims were blinded, while others went into comas or sufferedkidney failure. The dead range in age is between 19 to 50. There are reports of females among the victims.

According to the statement by Tripoli security directorate, the first poisoned case reported to Tripoli Medical Centre occurred at 8:00 p.m. on Thursday March 9, only to be followed by other cases to the centre and other hospitals scattered in the city and its suburbs.

There are other unaccounted for cases that were reported in hospitals outside Tripoli administrative limits, the statement said.

There has been no statement by the Prime Minister regarding this disaster yet.

The Tripoli security directorate said it has established a five-member committee of police and security officers to investigate the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice.

Alcohol is legally banned in Libya since 1969.Homemade Alcohol Kills More than 41 in Libya
12/03/2013 02:06:00

Benghazi Survivors

Lawmakers demand access to survivors injured in Benghazi attack 

Published March 06, 2013

FoxNews.com

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/06/lawmakers-demand-access-to-survivors-injured-in-benghazi-attack/

Six months after the Sept. 11 terror attack in Benghazi, Republican lawmakers are fuming that they haven’t been granted access to the survivors – several of whom, Fox News has learned, are still recovering at Walter Reed military hospital.

Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, told Fox News on Wednesday that he spoke to a “handful of people” when he visited Libya shortly after the attack but has struggled to gain access to the survivors ever since.

“We want talk to the survivors -- they won’t do that. And then the president has the gall to go on television and say ‘oh, we’re providing all the access’? Baloney. Bull-crap. That is not happening.”

Estimates of how many Americans were injured in the Libya assault vary.

Reps. Frank Wolf, R-Va., and Jim Gerlach, R-Pa., claim sources have told them up to 30 were injured, and up to seven may still be at Walter Reed. “Several may have required amputations,” they wrote in a letter to colleagues last week.

A source close to the survivors, though, told Fox News that seven were injured – not 30 – and that at least three are still at Walter Reed. Another may be recovering in California. The source said one of the injured underwent a partial leg amputation. Another is suffering from smoke inhalation and possible brain injury.

 Fox News has been told that some of the survivors work in clandestine services and do not want their names made public, though they do wonder why nobody from key committees has called them in for closed hearings to testify on what transpired that night.

 Chaffetz claimed Wednesday that the administration “will not give us the names.”

He said one person who went to the hospital even had their “name changed” on hospital records so as not to be identified.

The State Department has declined to say how many survivors were injured or hospitalized.

Secretary of State John Kerry, in an interview with Fox News, revealed Tuesday that he has visited one of the survivors in Bethesda, Md. – the location of the Walter Reed military hospital.

Kerry described the survivor as “remarkably courageous” and doing “very, very well.” He also said he also talked to the unnamed survivor’s wife.

Asked when the public might hear from the survivors, Kerry said “I can’t tell you – I don’t know what the circumstances are of any requests to talk to them or not.”

Wolf and Gerlach wrote a letter to Kerry March 1 formally requesting access to the survivors and asking for details about their condition.

They claim those injured may be a combination of State Department employees, CIA officials and security contractors.

“Having served in Benghazi, the perspective of these individuals would provide valuable insight to a dark day in American history – a day which is still shrouded in much mystery,” they wrote.

Fox News’ Jennifer Griffin, James Rosen and Catherine Herridge contributed to this report.

Benghazi attack: It's Written by James D. Hernando

Springfield

Mar. 6, 2013

clear Obama asleep on job

http://www.news-leader.com/article/20130307/OPINIONS03/303070034/Benghazi-attack-It-s-clear-Obama-asleep-on-job

I watched segments of the Senate hearing and investigation of the Benghazi attack in Libya that took four American lives.

Two things are becoming increasingly clear. The American people were lied to by the officials of the Obama administration, and the president was asleep on the job.

There is indisputable evidence that the president knew of the attack almost as soon as it began, had one 30-minute conversation with Leon Panetta and Gen. Martin Dempsey, who reported that a terror attack was under way. Neither the president nor any of his administrative staff had further communication with Panetta or Dempsey for eight hours!

No order was given to mobilize the forces in Italy or Tripoli in order to protect or extract our consulate personnel. These forces could have been there with boots on the ground in a little over an hour!

I’m sorry, but I have a dog (son) in this fight, and I think our military deserves a commander in chief who leads and has their back.

Why was there no State Department order to mobilize those forces and send them to Benghazi? We’re still waiting for a credible answer.

Why did ambassador Susan Rice say five days later that there was no evidence of a planned terrorist attack on the Benghazi consulate? In light of the testimony of Panetta and Dempsey, this was an unmitigated and bald-faced lie.

Gunman attack Church - Missionaries Arrested

Gunmen attack church in Libya's Benghazi: state media

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-libya-church-attack-idUSBRE9220F220130303

TRIPOLI | Sun Mar 3, 2013 3:37pm EST

(Reuters) - Gunmen attacked an Egyptian Coptic church in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, assaulting two priests, the official LANA news agency quoted the foreign ministry as saying on Sunday.

The foreign ministry said it "strongly condemned Thursday's attack on the Egyptian church ... and the aggression towards Father Paul Isaac and his assistant by the irresponsible armed men," LANA quoted a foreign ministry statement as saying.

It did not elaborate on the attacks but said an inquiry committee involving the interior, defense and justice ministries had been formed and had "taken the necessary measures to secure the church and its occupants".

It expressed "deep concern" over the attack, saying it was "contrary to the rules" of Islam and international human rights laws.

Libya's small Christian community has expressed fears over Islamist extremism as the government struggles to impose its authority over armed groups which have refused to lay down their weapons since the 2011 war that ousted Muammar Gaddafi.

In December, an explosion at a building belonging to a Coptic church in Dafniya, close to the western city of Misrata, killed two Egyptian men and wounded two others.

Last month, four foreigners were arrested in Benghazi on suspicion of being Christian missionaries and printing books about Christianity.

Hussein Bin Hmeid, a spokesman for the government-affiliated security apparatus called the Preventative Security which made the arrests, said the missionaries had since been transferred to Tripoli.

He said the four - an Egyptian, a South African, a Korean and a Swede who was travelling on a U.S. passport - were now in the hands of the Interior Ministry and had been visited by representatives from their countries.

(Reporting by Ali Shuaib; additional reporting by Ghaith Shennib in Benghazi; Writing by Marie-Louise Gumuchian; Editing by Jason Webb)

Islamist Militia Behind Benghazi Attack Makes a Comeback, Obama Golfs

February 16, 2013 By Daniel Greenfield 

http://frontpagemag.com/2013/dgreenfield/islamist-militia-behind-benghazi-attack-makes-a-comeback-obama-golfs/

When Obama said that he was going to get the folks who did this, he apparently meant jailing the filmmaker who made a Mohammed movie, not the Muslim killers of four Americans. With that job done, he went on yet another golfing vacation.

And in Benghazi, the Islamist militia behind the attack is taking power in the city once again.

After the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission last fall that left the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans dead, the Islamist militia widely accused of leading the assault all but disappeared amid a popular backlash.

But Ansar al-Sharia is edging back into society, and many of Benghazi’s residents now say they want it here.

The militia tentatively resumed its role as guardian of Benghazi’s two main hospitals last week. Its fighters have staked out positions at the western entrance to the city. They have also moved back onto their base, and residents say the group has been participating in community cleanup and charity work.

“Desperate times call for desperate measures,” said Jalal al-Gallal, a prominent political activist in the city and a former member of Libya’s transitional government. Ansar al-Sharia has some “hard-liners,” he said, “but they do actually carry out a lot of good work, whether we like it or not.”

Oh and Obama’s Islamist rebel Libyan government is up to its ears in this.

“The people attacked Ansar al-Sharia a few months ago because they were angry. But now they’re asking them to come back because there is no police and no real military,” said Essam al-Zubeir, a government spokesman in Tripoli.

Rafallah al-Sahati has recoiled, too.In September, the group’s commanders bragged about the militia’s role on the rescue team that assisted the American evacuation from the mission on the night of the attack. But the group largely disappeared from the public eye in the months since.

The group recently resumed command of checkpoints on the city’s perimeter, but it has changed its name to “Libyan Shield 3” because it now falls under the command of the Defense Ministry.

So one of the Islamist militias behind the Benghazi attack operates under the Libyan defense ministry and will be a beneficiary of US aid and possibly even military training.

But at least the guy who made the Mohammed movie is in jail. Mission accomplished.

About Daniel Greenfield

Daniel Greenfield, a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center, is a New York writer focusing on radical Islam. He is completing a book on the international challenges America faces in the 21st century.

Why Was JFK Assassinated?

WHY WAS JFK ASSASSINATED?

by TIM KELLY

http://www.gilmermirror.com/view/full_story/21865987/article-WHY-WAS-JFK-ASSASSINATED-?instance=lead_story_left_column

WHY WAS JFK ASSASSINATED?

by Tim KellyMarch 1, 2013

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has joined the ranks of skeptics and “conspiracy theorists” who believe that a lone gunman was not solely responsible for the assassination of his uncle, President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy said his father, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, believed the Warren Commission Report was a “shoddy piece of craftsmanship”

“The evidence at this point I think is very, very convincing that it was not a lone gunman,” he said, but he did not elaborate on what he believed may have happened.

John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, while riding in a motorcade through Dallas.

Robert F. Kennedy, while celebrating his victory in the California Democratic presidential primary, was shot and killed on June 5, 1968, at a Los Angeles hotel. He was supposedly the victim of another “lone nut.”

RFK’s assassination and the circumstances surrounding it have spawned almost as many conspiracy theories as his brother’s murder five years earlier.

And RFK Jr.’s remarks, coming early in a year that will mark the 50th anniversary of JFK’s assassination, will no doubt provide rhetorical fodder for the legions of critics of the Warren Commission Report.

That report concluded that the 35th president of the United States was hit from the rear by two of three shots fired by a deranged 24-year-old former Marine named Lee Harvey Oswald. According to the report, the first bullet hit JFK in the back, exited through his neck, and went on to inflict multiple injuries on Texas Governor John Connally. The second bullet missed the presidential limousine, ricocheted off the curb and grazed a bystander. The third bullet hit the president in the head, killing him.

What has made many question the Warren Commission’s credibility is the fact that it was largely controlled by former CIA director Allen Dulles. President Kennedy had ousted Dulles as director of the CIA in 1961, after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Kennedy had also reportedly voiced his intention “to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.”

From the moment of its release in 1964, the Warren Report became a target of criticism, owing largely to such difficulties as its “single-bullet theory,” which appeared to twist the laws of physics.

As Mark Lane, a pioneer in JFK assassination research, noted, “The only way you can believe the Report is not to have read it.”

Another reason to doubt the report’s conclusions is Oswald’s apparent connections to the U.S. intelligence community, an important detail not mentioned in the report’s 889 pages. After all, if Oswald was a low-level intelligence agent, as a large body of evidence suggests, is it reasonable to believe he was the “lone-nut” assassin of Warren Commission legend?

But even if Oswald was the gunman and was able to get off two miraculously accurate shots, he did not have the power to withdraw the police motorcycle escorts, or to order the Secret Service to stand down, or to alter the testimony of funeral-home staff who received the body. The Warren Commission never explained these systemic breakdowns that left the president vulnerable and the chain of evidence questionable.

And it should also be mentioned that a U.S. House of Representatives select committee concluded in 1978, after a two-year investigation, that JFK was probably a victim of an elaborate conspiracy (not a “lone nut).

Who could have been part of such a conspiracy?

Theories abound. Some finger the Mafia, while others blame rogue anti-Castro Cubans, or the CIA, or the FBI, or the Pentagon, or Asian drug lords, or eccentric Texas oil barons, or even then-vice-president Lyndon Johnson. Others have posited scenarios involving a combination of some or all of these groups.

The Kennedy administration had certainly ruffled a lot of feathers in its thousand days. Indeed, JFK’s apparent turn to peace may have been the reason why he was gunned down.

At first glance, JFK was an unlikely candidate for peacenik martyrdom.

In 1960, Kennedy campaigned to the right of Richard Nixon, warning of “a missile gap” that had left the nation vulnerable to a Russian nuclear attack.

He entered the White House a committed cold warrior, declaring the time to be an “hour of maximum danger” for freedom. America, he said, would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” A primary beneficiary of the Kennedy administration was the military-industrial complex, as spending on both conventional and nuclear forces increased sharply from 1961 to 1963.

However, after clashing with his Joint Chiefs over a number of issues and witnessing the apparent treachery of the CIA regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy developed a mistrust of his national-security managers.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war, had a profound effect on JFK, and he emerged from it a changed man, determined to end the Cold War peacefully.

In June 1963, JFK delivered a speech at American University in which he called for the total abolishment of nuclear weapons. A few months later, his administration signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviets.

He also began having private correspondences with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which enraged the CIA, and he was seeking a rapprochement with Cuba’s dictator Fidel Castro, which further incensed the agency.

But perhaps his National Security Action Memorandum 263 calling for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam by the end of 1965 was the final straw for the national security state.

That order, if implemented, would have disrupted many “national-security” operations that had been going on in Southeast Asia since the end of the Second World War. Interestingly, just days after JFK’s death, Lyndon Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum 273 reversing JFK’s withdrawal plan. The rest, as they say, is history.

This post was written by:Tim Kelly

Tim Kelly is a columnist and policy advisor at The Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Virginia, a correspondent for Radio America’s Special Investigator, and a political cartoonist.

"The Definitive Report?"

American Thinker

March 3, 2013

Benghazi: The Definitive Report?

By John McLaughlin

http://www.americanthinker.com/2013/03/benghazi_the_definitive_report.html

With all of the political wrangling over events in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, attention in some conservative channels has focused on a well-hyped recently released e-book.  Benghazi: The Definitive Report claims in its prologue to "cut through the static and white noise generated by the media pundits, partisan politics, and unfounded conspiracy theories" to be "the definitive account of the Benghazi attack for years to come."  Unfortunately, the book fails to totally live up to its claims.

Written by Jack Murphy and Brandon Webb, two decorated Special Operations veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and operate a website dedicated to special forces personnel, the  book relies on "consultations" with experts and Special Ops military members privy to details of events surrounding the Benghazi attack.  Accounts of valor shown by those who fought that day in Benghazi, especially CIA agents and former Navy SEALs Ty Woods and Glen Doherty (killed while protecting dozens of Americans), tell a tale of action-packed drama.

If Woods, Doherty, and other Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) agents provide the heroes of this book, the clear villain is John Brennan, President Obama's top counterterrorism adviser at the time of the Benghazi massacre and now his nominee to become CIA director.  The authors allege that Brennan received carte blanche from Obama to run totally covert operations in North Africa and the Middle East outside the traditional command structure, "provided he didn't do anything that ended up becoming an exposé in The New York Times and embarrassing the administration."

Closely associated with Brennan's clandestine war, the authors identify Admiral William McRaven, presently head of U.S. Special Operations Command and formerly of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  Brennan, the authors allege, hatches the plans, while McRaven mobilizes the JSOC assets like ISA, Navy SEAL Team Six, or Delta Force troops to execute lethal "off the books" combat missions "not coordinated through the Pentagon or other governmental agencies, including the CIA."  It is one or more of these missions in Libya in the summer of 2012 targeting high-level al-Qaeda operatives which the authors say triggered the retaliatory September attack in Benghazi.

If that were not enough, the authors further allege that Brennan, seemingly in his spare time, runs another "highly compartmentalized program out of the White House" to transfer weapons from Libya to the "rebel fighters in Syria" -- an interesting way to identify a force known to be heavily populated by many of the same anti-American jihadists whom American forces have been fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Undercutting the authors' theory of a focused retaliatory attack is an extensive dissertation describing Libya as a longstanding haven for Islamic jihadists, a major source of military forces already fighting Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an area riddled with caches of weapons.  They suggest that the CIA presence in Benghazi provided a headquarters to gather intelligence on local militias, hunt down WMD (including suspected stores of yellowcake uranium), and collect as much of Gaddafi's extensive arsenal as could be found before it ended up in jihadist hands.

In spite of a clear and growing danger to Americans in the area and a poor diplomatic facility in which to transact business, this "definitive account" makes no effort to explain why Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith (a State Departmentinformation technology specialist), and two security agents chose the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attack to travel to Benghazi, where only three other security personnel and four unarmed local militia guards awaited them.

The book speaks of a meeting between Stevens and a senior Turkish diplomat just before the attack.  While others have speculated about this meeting because of Turkey's well-known efforts to supply munitions to anti-Assad forces in Syria, the authors say nothing further.

The book does provide a riveting account of the attack, which began at the State Department compound shortly after 9:30 p.m.  Within minutes, militia fighters spread through the compound, driving Stevens and Smith to a recently constructed safe room, which is soon set afire.  At the nearby CIA Annex, Ty Woods, a 20-year Navy SEAL veteran and senior CIA paramilitary agent, formulates a rescue plan in response to frantic radio calls for help from the embattled compound. 

Within 30 minutes of the start of hostilities and in direct defiance of orders to stand down, Smith and six other CIA agents in heavily armed vehicles proceed to the compound and engage the attackers.  In a two-hour firefight, Woods and his team find Smith's body, search for Stevens without success, and rescue the State Department personnel.  With the element of surprise gone, ammunition running low, and the attacking militia massing for another assault, Woods orders everyone back to the annex with no combat casualties.

For the balance of the night, the fight shifts to the heavily fortified annex.  We're told that, about 2 a.m., a cell phone call to the CIA reports that Ambassador Stevens's body can be found at the local hospital.  They arrange for a trusted Libyan to confirm the report and transport the body to the airport

A little after 5 a.m., a seven-man paramilitary team from the main CIA base in Tripoli led by Doherty arrive via a commandeered Libyan jet aircraft (reportedly paying $30,000 cash to the crew) and break through to aid their comrades.  During the intense fight, both Woods and Doherty would die from a mortar attack about an hour later, and the base would be evacuated shortly thereafter.  Approximately twelve hours elapsed from the first attack until over thirty U.S. personnel, including the killed and wounded, evacuated Benghazi by aircraft for Tripoli.

As the authors make clear, "[t]he CIA did an exemplary job with virtually no outside support."  Except for two unarmed Predator drones redirected to the scene by the DOD's AFRICOM (Africa Command) at the request of an onsite JSOC operator, no other assistance came.  The book, in its detailed action timeline, fails to support claims appearing in American Thinker and other sources that Woods and Doherty died as they painted laser targets on jihadist mortar nests expecting  assistance from overhead aircraft.  Instead, the authors flatly reject rumors of any nearby AC-130 gunship or armed drone and tell how the attackers' "skilled mortar team" used a common trial-and-error tactic of "bracketing" to find their mark.

The authors also reject stories that General Carter Ham, AFRICOM commander at the time of the attack, had "gone rogue" and was attempting to provide help to Benghazi when he was relieved of command.  "Great story, but completely false," the authors say, citing a flat denial of the story by General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Though the Pentagon announced the retirement of General Ham the following month, the official explanation is accepted in the book.  Still, confusion remains.

 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that he, General Dempsey, and General Ham had agreed that night that any assistance would be too risky.  However, Ham later told a congressmanthat no order came down to act and made no mention of any consensus discussion.

Authors Murphy and Webb deal sympathetically with collateral damage from the Benghazi attack involving the forced retirement of General David Petraeus from the CIA.  The book details how Petraeus soon realized that he had not been informed of Brennan's compartmentalized JSOC operations, which blindsided the CIA's Benghazi personnel.  "[F]urious about being left in the lurch by the Obama administration," Petraeus concluded that "he was a perpetual outsider in the administration" and began preparations to resign after the election.

According to the Murphy-Webb account, Petraeus's well-laid plans were upset by high-ranking officers in the CIA who opposed his policies and leadership stylewithin the agency.  We're told that, aware of the poorly suppressed extramarital affair involving the general and a female staffer, these officers initiated and kept alive an FBI investigation which finally forced Petraeus's resignation on their terms, not his -- an act which, the authors say, "seems purely vindictive, and perhaps was meant to sabotage any future possibility of a presidential campaign."

The book drops little nuggets, such as claiming that "SEAL Team Six had to liquidate Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan" lest his capture reveal an association with the CIA during the Mujahidin's war against the Soviets.  Yet it ignores major issues, such as reaction within the White House to the real-time Predator sensor data available there and why special forces, which the authors must know exist at the ready within a couple hours' flight time from Benghazi, were not activated to assist.

The account states that "contrary to the many media myths about Benghazi, requests for help were not denied by the Obama administration."  This comes just two sentences before we're told that Ty Woods's request to render assistance to personnel under attack was denied by his CIA chief of base.

In fact, the authors seem to go out of their way to help President Obama and high-ranking DOD officials evade accountability.  Calling Obama "an aloof and rather ineffectual leader," they claim that the Benghazi attack "really doesn't involve the President all that much one way or the other."  How odd is that?  We've been repeatedly told that Obama pores over kill lists to pick targets for assassination, was deeply engaged in a Navy SEAL operation against Somali pirates, and led the effort to kill Osama bin Laden.  Yet this time, Obama chooses not to get involved when a classic setback to American interests is occurring?  Why do these special forces veterans believe that the commander-in-chief gets to make that choice without any hint at dereliction of duty?

The book does address the infamous internet video, claiming that it was a fabricated cover story by the administration intended to distract attention, both nationally and internationally, from paramilitary attacks going on in Libya, secret weapons transfers from Libya to Syria, and other clandestine operations -- the "true motivations" behind the jihadist assault.

Murphy and Webb begin their narrative with a promise to "name names and hold accountable those who acted cowardly and those who erred by seeking to protect their political careers at the expense of human lives."  However, we're left with little to chew on after that claim.  Clearly, they have no love for John Brennan, calling him an "ambitious bureaucrat" and "world-class windbag" who must be "reined in or fired" if the post-Afghanistan war on terror is to be successful.  If not, they say, "we'll see plenty more Benghazis happen."  However, until better investigation of other players in this drama, from President Obama on down, reaches the Brennan scrutiny level, we must await a further definitive report.

Canada quick to warn diplomats after Benghazi attack

Emails show Canadian reaction to September attack on U.S. consulate

By Laura Payton, CBC News 

Posted: Feb 26, 2013 5:16 AM ET 

Last Updated: Feb 26, 2013 9:26 AM ET

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/02/25/pol-records-insight-canadian-reaction-to-benghazi-attack.html?cmp=rss

Newly released documents shed light on how the Canadian government responded following an attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, last summer.

The heavily redacted documents, obtained by CBC News under federal Access to Information laws, show officials in Ottawa reacted within hours of confirmation of the Sept. 11, 2012 attack on the American mission in Benghazi.

Attackers armed with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades had stormed the U.S. consulate and set it on fire, killing two diplomats, including Christopher Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya. Two more officials were killed in a related attack on a second U.S. facility in the city.

The attack on the mission in Benghazi started at 9:42 p.m. local time on Sept. 11, according to a timeline released by the Pentagon. That's 3:42 p.m. ET.

In an email sent just before 9 a.m. ET on Sept. 12, the morning after the attack, a secret briefing note from the Department of Foreign Affairs' regional security abroad unit outlined safety measures for the Canadian embassy in Tripoli, Libya's capital. The measures are blacked out in the version released publicly.

Another briefing note, marked secret and dated Sept. 12 at 12:30 p.m., says the department "disseminated a security message to inform all missions of the threat and request all missions review their security posture and ensure readiness," and that the regional security abroad unit had been in touch with the missions in Tripoli and Cairo, Egypt, and had produced briefing notes on events in Benghazi and Cairo.

A spokesman for Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird wouldn't say what time the first messages went out, citing security concerns, but allowed that they went out "early morning" on Sept. 12.

"By midday on the 12th, the two missions in question [Tripoli and Cairo] had updated security instructions relevant to the Canadian context at the time," Chris Day said in an email to CBC News.

The documents show the also department arranged by early afternoon on Sept. 12 a conference call for heads of mission in the Middle East and North Africa.

'Reacted thoroughly and rapidly'

NDP international co-operation critic Hélène Laverdière, who served as a Canadian diplomat in Chile and Senegal, says it sounds like officials "reacted thoroughly and rapidly."

"There was probably a quick reaction on the ground, because you have what happens in Ottawa, but the people on the ground, they're also aware of what's happening, and they're also talking with colleagues from other missions and sometimes exchanging experience about security measures and things like that," she said.

Laverdière says there was a minor earthquake when she was posted in Chile, and within 10 minutes, colleagues in Ottawa were checking in on the Canadians in Santiago.

"Quite sincerely, my impression … is that the department reacted rather quickly [to what happened in Benghazi] and I can tell you from my experience, all along, it's always a priority: security of the mission, security of the information, but above all, security of the people."

Canada temporarily closed its embassies in Cairo and Tripoli from Sept. 13-16, and Khartoum, in Sudan, from Sept. 14-17, after outbursts of unrest following the release of an amateur American film called The Innocence of Muslims, which ridicules the prophet Mohammed.

"We take the safety of our personnel and our missions overseas very seriously," Day said. "We are always monitoring events closely and taking appropriate security measures."

The U.S. embassy in Cairo also saw a major protest the day of the attack on the consulate in Benghazi, with demonstrators climbing the walls of the mission and tearing down the American flag.

The attack in Benghazi is now thought by U.S. officials to have been a planned attack by militants linked to al-Qaeda.

'Attack on diplomacy'

The embassy in Libya is staffed by five Canadians. Canada had no diplomats in Benghazi at the time of the attack, Baird said in September.

Children and spouses aren't allowed to follow officials on posting in Tripoli, one of the post-attack memos says, and Canada-based staff must take a hostile environment training course before being posted there. They receive "thorough" security briefings on arrival and throughout their time in Libya, it says.

Stevens was the first U.S. diplomat killed in a violent assault since 1979.

"It's an attack on diplomacy, and obviously we continually look at the safety and security environments for Canadian personnel," Baird told reporters on Sept. 12. He was travelling in India at the time.

"We're obviously not present in Benghazi. But as you would expect, we'll re-evaluate the environment, as we regularly do, for our personnel in Tripoli. Obviously, we understood that [the country] wasn't going to go from Moammar Gadhafi to Thomas Jefferson overnight, and we continue to put our hope in the actions to bring civil society and pluralism and democracy to the people of Libya."

Baird also said the government was reviewing embassy security around the world.

"Obviously diplomats don't sign up to be soldiers, and their safety and security is a high priority. We've made major strides over the past 10 years of the department to meet these goals. There are areas where there is room for improvement and obviously we are seized with the importance of this."