Lessons from Benghazi:
Investigation Leaves Important Questions Unanswered
Abstract
The September 11, 2012, attack on the Special Mission
compound and annex in Benghazi, Libya, not only resulted in the tragic death of
America's first Ambassador killed abroad since 1988, it served as a stark
reminder of the myriad dangers facing the nation's diplomatic presence
overseas.
Following this deadly
attack, an Accountability Review Board (ARB) was convened by the U.S. State
Department with the task of investigating and reporting on the incident. The
ARB's findings, along with other investigations, serve as an indictment of the
State Department's unpreparedness before the
Benghazi
attack, and suggest a need for greater communication and transparency in
preparing for, and anticipating, future dangers. Key questions remain and
necessitate answers in order to better protect
U.S.
diplomatic facilities, and the people who serve in them, in the future.
When armed terrorists stormed the United States Special
Mission compound in Benghazi, Libya,
on September 11, 2012,
killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, it was not
the first such breach of a U.S.
diplomatic installation. In fact, it was one of four such attacks that occurred
over the course of the week in Egypt,
Yemen, Tunisia,
and Libya.
This recent spate of violence underscored the often tenuous
relationship that exists between evolving power structures in the Middle
East, as exemplified by the Arab Spring and subsequent regime
changes in Egypt
and Libya, as
well as the sometimes precarious security of America’s
diplomatic presence abroad. This phenomenon, however, is nothing new; nor is it
relegated to the Middle East. Several significant acts of
terror have occurred over the past 50 years, which have resulted in the deaths
of American citizens deployed abroad.
Given this history of violence, questions arise about
whether lessons should have been learned that could have led to more
appropriate action prior to the Benghazi
attack. Questions also arise about the scope and nature of the information
received by the State Department and White House before the onset of violence
in Benghazi, and to what extent
that information should have inspired a different course of action. Despite
Congress’s efforts to investigate the events surrounding the attack, these and
other key concerns remain unanswered. Fully understanding what and who was
behind the September 11, 2012,
terrorist attack on the U.S.
facility in Benghazi is vital to
preparing for future security threats to American embassies, consulates, and
diplomatic missions.
To ensure that the remaining questions are answered,
Congress should establish a select committee, preferably bicameral, to examine
the details of the attack and determine how to improve U.S.
diplomatic security. At the same time, in order to address future diplomatic
security, Congress and the Administration should:
Recognize the true nature and scope of the Islamist
terrorist threat,
Conduct frequent and extensive threat assessments for
diplomatic facilities abroad,
Combat stovepiping in addressing diplomatic security and
ensure a comprehensive government response, and
Require that the investigations result in meaningful
legislative and executive branch follow-up.
History of Violence Toward U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities
During the second half of the 20th century, there were at
least 40 major
security breaches and
attacks against U.S. diplomatic installations throughout the world
[1] In 1968, Viet Cong fighters stormed
the U.S. embassy in Vietnam and engaged in a firefight with U.S. Marines. After
nearly nine hours of fighting the embassy was secured; however, the attack
unnerved the
United States,
whose presence in the region had begun only two years earlier
[2]
More infamously, the Iranian Hostage Crisis commenced on
November 4, 1979, setting off a
diplomatic and national security stalemate that lasted for 444 days. In the
wake of the Islamic Revolution in
Iran,
hundreds of students stormed the
U.S.
embassy in
Tehran, took over 50
Americans as hostages and effectively severed
U.S.
and Iranian diplomatic relations. The hostage crisis came to an end only on
January 20, 1981, following the
inauguration of President Ronald Reagan
[3]
More recently, in 1998, the
U.S.
embassies in
Kenya
and
Tanzania
were bombed in near-simultaneous attacks that resulted in 223 deaths and over
4,000 injuries. The attacks were led by al-Qaeda, introducing the terror
organization and its leader Osama bin Laden into the American lexicon
[4]
On the same day as the attack in Libya, September 11, 2012,
an angry mob in Egypt climbed onto the U.S. embassy compound in Cairo and tore
down the American flag, resulting in a confrontation with security personnel in
which 13 people were injured
[5] Less than two days later, hundreds
of demonstrators also stormed the gates of the U.S. embassy in Yemen, smashing
windows of the embassy building and burning cars. Fifteen people were injured
before security personnel were able to contain the situation
[6]
As violence erupted in
Egypt,
Libya, and
Yemen,
similar uprisings began to foment throughout the
Middle East,
Asia, and
Africa. In
Kuwait,
nearly 200 demonstrators gathered outside the
U.S.
embassy chanting anti-American slogans
[7] Protests formed around the
U.S.
diplomatic presence in
Tunisia,
Morocco, and
Sudan;
protestors in
Bangladesh
and
Iran took
to the streets in similar fashion. Even more recently, and unrelated to the
pattern of violence last fall, a suicide bomber at the U.S. embassy in Turkey
left one dead and one wounded when he detonated his bomb at the security
checkpoint
[8]
Unfortunately these incidents represent only a fraction of
the nearly four dozen known and significant acts of violence and aggression
that have been directed toward U.S.
embassies, consulates, and consular personnel over the past 50 years.
Libya,
Pre-Attack
In late 2010, popular uprisings across North Africa
emerged in protest to the region’s oppressive autocrats. By February 2011, the
Arab Spring reached Libya
where the opposition sought the removal of dictator Muammar Qadhafi, who had
ruled for over 40 years. With support from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Gulf States,
the opposition advanced from Benghazi
toward the capital city, Tripoli.
On October 20, 2011,
rebels captured and killed Qadhafi outside his hometown of Siirte.
Since the regime fell,
Libya
has struggled to restore stability. It took nine months after Qadhafi’s death
for the opposition’s political body, the National Transitional Council (NTC),
to hold elections. Despite electing a national congress and a president, the
government has failed to unify the country. Armed militias have rebuffed
attempts by the government to integrate them with the Libyan military, and
extremist groups are active throughout the country. In particular, the report
by the Accountability Review Board, convened by the Department of State, details
incidents demonstrating the dangerous circumstances in which American diplomats
were operating in
Benghazi and
elsewhere in
Libya.
These include armed robberies, attacks on
U.S.
and international diplomatic personnel as well as on nongovernmental organizations,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross
[9]
Furthermore, during the civil war, the regime’s arms
warehouses were bombed and looted and their contents proliferated throughout
the region. Tanks, machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades are
just a few of the thousands of weapons that authorities have reclaimed. While
the
United States,
NATO allies, and Libyan authorities have had a degree of success in tracking
down some munitions, large numbers are still missing. These include thousands
of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), demonstrated to be capable of
downing commercial jetliners
[10]
Fallout has not been limited to
Libya.
Immediately after Qadhafi’s death, well-armed Tuareg fighters, once loyal to
the regime, returned to their homeland in
Niger
and
Mali. Those
that returned to
Mali
joined the ranks of the separatist National Movement for the Liberation of
Azawad (MNLA), which was already engaged in fighting the Malian army. This set
off a chain of events that contributed to a military coup and the occupation of
northern
Mali
by a coalition of Islamist terrorist groups
[11 ]
It is evident that there was a clear and present security
threat against U.S.
interests in Benghazi.
Ultimately, the inability of Libya’s
fledgling government to implement law and order has contributed to insecurity
throughout the region. Considering the violent conditions on the ground, it is
evident that there was a clear and present security threat against U.S.
interests in Benghazi, although no
specific threat of attack on the Special Mission had been cited by U.S.
intelligence. Nevertheless, despite the lack of intelligence on September 11, 2012, this threat
quickly became reality when armed terrorists descended on the U.S.
consulate in Benghazi. In doing so,
the attackers perpetrated an act of terror that claimed the life of the first
American Ambassador murdered since 1988.
The Benghazi
Attack
Early in the evening of
September 11, 2012, Ambassador Christopher Stevens ended a
meeting with the Turkish consul general and concluded his workday. Shortly
thereafter, just before 9:45 p.m., a mob descended upon the Special Mission
compound
[12] The consulate building, surrounded
on three sides by orchards and a soccer field, was quickly overwhelmed
[13]
The compound was guarded by four unarmed members of the
local guard group, the Blue Mountain Libya (BML); three armed members of the
local militia, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade; and five
U.S.
diplomatic security (DS) officers. When the attack began, the February 17
Brigade members and the BML guards fled without raising the alarm. The DS
officers, on the other hand, immediately raised the alarm, alerted the nearby
CIA
annex and the embassy in Tripoli, and went into action, trying to get the
Ambassador and other personnel to safety
[14]
By
10 p.m. the
compound building was engulfed in flames. One DS officer was with Ambassador
Stevens and foreign service officer Sean Smith in the “safe area” within the
compound. When the smoke became overwhelming, the DS officer attempted to lead
them out of the building through a window, but was separated from them in the
smoke and chaos. Later, the other DS officers and the annex security team
located Smith’s body. All attempts to locate the Ambassador were unsuccessful.
All other American personnel retreated to the nearby annex
[ 15]
At approximately
11:15 p.m.
an unmanned aerial surveillance vehicle, diverted from another mission by the
Department of Defense, reached the facility in
Benghazi.
After
midnight, looters pulled the
unresponsive body of Ambassador Stevens from the burning Special Mission
building. The Ambassador’s body was brought to the nearby
Benghazi
Medical Center
where he was attended to as an unidentified patient. He was declared dead at
approximately
2:00 a.m[16]
Around
5:00 a.m.
intense fighting again resumed, now at the nearby
CIA
annex where diplomatic personnel had holed up. American security forces, joined
by recently arrived personnel from the embassy in
Tripoli,
engaged the terrorists in a ferocious firefight that claimed the lives of DS
officers Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, both former Navy SEALs
[17]
Fighting continued for several more hours before the first flight
carrying American consular personnel left Benghazi between 7:00 a.m. and 7:30
a.m. Around 8:30 a.m., Ambassador Stevens’s body was brought from the hospital
to the airport via ambulance. One of the DS officers that had been at the
compound positively identified the body. By
10:00
a.m. the final flight carrying the last remaining Americans,
including Ambassador Stevens’s body, left
Benghazi,
drawing the evening to its tragic conclusion
[18]
The Investigation
On
September 20,
2012, less than 10 days after the deadly
Benghazi
attack, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convened an Accountability Review
Board (ARB) to investigate and report on the attack in
Benghazi.
Clinton’s authority to convene such
an inquiry stemmed from the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
of 1986
[19]
The omnibus bill, itself an outgrowth of a myriad of
diplomatic security breaches and embassy attacks, stipulated that “[a] Board
shall consist of five members, 4 appointed by the Secretary of State, 1
appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.”
[20] Such a board would be charged with
responsibility for examining the “facts and circumstances surrounding the
serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or
related to a United States Government mission abroad.”
[21]
Similarly, the Senate’s Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee (HSGAC) produced a report analyzing the conditions and
actions that precipitated the
Benghazi
attack on September 11. Nearly three months after both investigations were
initiated, the ARB and HSGAC issued their public findings, on
December 18, 2012, and
December 31, 2012, respectively
[22]
The ARB, chaired by former Ambassador Thomas Pickering and
retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, as well as
the HSGAC, issued a number of critical findings. These include:
Security Gaps. Per international standards, a host
nation is generally recognized to be responsible for helping to maintain the
security of other nations’ diplomatic facilities within its borders. In Libya,
however, the turmoil that followed the fall of the Qadhafi regime left the
country without a strong central authority. More than a year later, Libya’s
National Transitional Council is still struggling to restore stability.
According to the HSGAC report, the State Department failed to augment the
compound with additional security staff, despite being fully aware of the
Libyan government’s inability to adequately provide security for the Mission in
Benghazi. It was within the context of a recognizably deficient Libyan
government support system that the United States relied heavily on local,
indigenous security, namely the February 17 Brigade and Blue Mountain Libya.
The reliance of the State Department on such local security
groups, however, remains unnerving given their lack of skill, obstinacy, and
near-abdication of duties following a dispute over salaries and working
conditions prior to the September 11,
2012, attacks. According to the ARB:
Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in
responding to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission
in April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability
in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks…. At the time of
Ambassador Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying
Special Mission vehicle movements in protest [over salary and working hours].
The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities
were to provide early warning and control access to the SMC, were also poorly
skilled
[23]
Indeed, the ARB indicated that it found little evidence that
the February 17 Brigade and BML provided meaningful assistance in securing the
facility in Benghazi during the
attack.
The State Department failed to augment the Benghazi
compound with additional security staff, despite being fully aware of the
Libyan government’s inability to adequately provide security.
Also complicating security efforts in
Benghazi
was the fact that the Special Mission remained a temporary facility, the impact
of which is twofold. First, personnel were stationed at the Special Mission for
short periods of time. This made it difficult to develop consistent security
protocols, and it also meant that no personnel were there long enough to become
experienced in their roles. Second, there was a great deal of ambiguity surrounding
security funding and resource decisions. Indeed, according to the HSGAC report,
“Because the Benghazi facility was temporary, no security standards applied to
it.”
[24]This included the provision of physical
security measures and barriers at the facility.
Leadership Failures. Ultimately, the ARB found that
responsibility for the gaps in security in Benghazi rested in part on
“[s]ystemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior
levels within two bureaus of the State Department.”
[25] The lack of preparation and
adequate staffing likely resulted from an inchoate sense of where ultimate
authority rested in making final decisions related to security staffing needs.
The ARB concluded that among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi, “[t]here
appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and
empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.”
[26]
At the same time, security decisions appear to have been
stovepiped, rather than being viewed as a “shared responsibility” among the
appropriate actors in Washington
[27] Greater cooperation appears to be
needed between the intelligence community, the Department of State, and the
Department of Defense to protect American diplomatic facilities in the future.
Indeed, in Benghazi, Defense Department–support decisions may have been
hindered by the lack of shared information and operational awareness between
the Defense and State Departments. The Defense Department’s Africa Command
(AFRICOM) was responsible for working with the State Department in developing
security assessments and evacuation plans. However, it appears that the State
Department did not know how long it would take the Defense Department to
respond in the event of a crisis, nor did the Defense Department seem to know
how many individuals were present at the
Benghazi
facility—which is important to know in the event of an evacuation
[28]
Intelligence Deficiencies. Addressing the intelligence
gaps that preceded the attack, the Accountability Review Board found a
discontinuity in the understanding, and anticipation, of terrorist activity at
or near the Special Mission compound in Benghazi. “Known gaps existed in the
intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya
and the potential threat they posed to U.S.
interests, although some threats were known to exist,” the ARB concluded.
Similarly, the HSGAC report concluded that the lack of
specific intelligence warnings may have partially stemmed from the narrow focus
of the intelligence community in Libya on al-Qaeda and its known affiliates:
“[T]he activities of local terrorist and Islamist extremist groups in Libya may
have received insufficient attention from the IC [intelligence community] prior
to the attack, partially because some of the groups possessed ambiguous
operational ties to core al-Qaeda and its primary affiliates.”
[29] This finding seems particularly
relevant given that the local extremist group that has claimed responsibility
for the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia
Libya,
is neither directly tied to al-Qaeda nor a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization.
The ARB concluded that amongst Washington,
Tripoli, and Benghazi,
“[t]here appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was
responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security
considerations.”
Ultimately, both the ARB and HSGAC cautioned against an
over-reliance on “warning intelligence” in preparation for the onset of
violence at high-risk, high-threat diplomatic missions
[30] Instead, the State Department
should increase its awareness of the wide array of other factors that could
alert it to any rapid or ongoing deterioration of regions in which a mission is
operating. Indeed, a wealth of information existed prior to the attack
indicating that the security situation in Benghazi was deteriorating. This
information could have been used by State Department officials to inform
security needs at the Special Mission facility. Unfortunately, this reactionary
mentality seems to be par for the course, as the Administration continues to
broadly treat terrorism under a law enforcement paradigm that focuses on
response-oriented policies and prosecuting terrorists. This approach takes the
place of proactive efforts to enhance intelligence tools and thwart terrorist
attacks long before the public is in danger
[31]
Secretary Clinton’s Testimony
On
January 23, 2013,
after the release of each report’s respective findings, Secretary Clinton
testified before Congress
[32] Her testimony offered few answers
to the questions that remained. Clinton attempted to place the Benghazi attack
within the historical context of violence against diplomatic missions and
seemed to convey a sense of incredulity at the public nature of Congress’s
inquiry. “This committee never had a public hearing about the 17 other ARBs
because they’re classified,” Clinton stated
[33] Of the 19 ARBs convened since 1988,
only two unclassified versions have been released
[34]
The now former Secretary of State, while openly taking
responsibility for the September 11, 2012, attack, downplayed the extent to
which she was personally aware of the deteriorating security situation in
Benghazi as well as the formal requests for additional security. Clinton
testified that those security requests were handled by security professionals
and did not reach her desk. Unfortunately, this equivocation does not indicate
that Clinton’s office fully
acknowledged its own failures in understanding and reacting to the evolving
threat situation in Benghazi.
In one of the most contentious moments of her testimony,
Secretary Clinton reacted angrily to questions posed by Senator Ron Johnson
(R–WI) concerning the nature and origins of the Benghazi
attacks by declaring:
With all due respect, the fact is we had four dead
Americans. Was it because of a protest or was it because of guys out for a walk
one night, [who] decided to go kill some Americans? What difference at this
point does it make? It is our job to figure out what happened and do everything
we can to prevent it from ever happening again, Senator
[35]
The differences, of course, between a coordinated terrorist
attack, a planned protest, or an impromptu event spurred by “guys out for a
walk” are manifold. Secretary Clinton’s argument lacked resonance because the
advent of a coordinated terrorist attack could have been prevented through
improved intelligence-gathering mechanisms and concurrent increases in
security, a scenario far less conceivable in the face of a spontaneous riot.
Unanswered Questions Remain
The ARB and HSGAC report articulated several areas where the
State Department failed to properly anticipate and implement adequate security
measures to protect diplomatic personnel in Libya.
However, there remained glaring omissions within the reports. Many had hoped
that Secretary Clinton’s testimony would shed greater light on the
circumstances surrounding the Benghazi attack before its culmination and
address many of these omissions. Yet, several key questions remain unanswered,
including:
Which counterterrorism and early-warning measures were in
place to address security threats? To learn how to prevent future attacks
against U.S. overseas facilities, it is necessary to know what counterterrorism
efforts, if any, were in place to reduce the threat of an attack in the first
place. Open-source documents reveal that eastern Libya has long been a hotbed
of instability and that U.S. facilities in Libya were operating under high-risk
conditions. More analysis and information is needed to determine which
procedures were followed to identify and disrupt terrorist operations aimed at
diplomatic personnel and facilities.
Which risk assessments were performed and which
risk-mitigation measures were adopted before the attack? Since the fall of
Muammar Qadhafi’s regime, Libya’s fledgling government has been unable to stem
the influence of extremist entities. The instability on the ground therefore
created an apparent risk to U.S. personnel. Risk assessments that evaluate
threats, criticality, and vulnerability are needed. Then, the most prudent
combination of risk-mitigation measures can be adopted. Together, these methods
are a proven strategy for enhancing physical security.
What kind of contingency planning was undertaken and
exercised to respond to armed assaults against U.S. facilities
in Benghazi? Early-warning planning
and risk assessments are essential to countering threats against U.S. personnel
and facilities, but they have their limits. Incomplete data and inaccurate
judgments are challenges that could result in unforeseen consequences.
Contingency planning must be flexible and adaptable in order to ensure an
adequate response to security threats. To fully assess the Administration’s
response to the Benghazi attack,
any future investigating committee would need to know which contingency plans
were in place, how developed they were, and to what extent they were
implemented.
How was the interagency response to the incident organized
and managed? When a crisis puts the lives of U.S. personnel and U.S.
interests at risk, the whole of government should respond with all reasonably
available resources. Future investigations should address the command, control,
and coordination of efforts to organize and integrate interagency responses
after a threat becomes evident.
Clinton’s
testimony aside, understanding the level of requests for additional security,
or warnings of worsening conditions on the ground, that reached within the
State Department, is crucial. This understanding naturally leads to questions
regarding how deeply the State Department and White House have communicated on
this issue.
In the immediate aftermath and weeks following the Benghazi
attacks, the White House promoted a narrative centered on the notion that an
impromptu demonstration against a crudely made YouTube video insulting the
prophet Mohammed unraveled into the chaos and violence that engulfed the
mission in Benghazi. Although the investigation is still ongoing, evidence
suggests that officials at the State Department and White House believed within
hours of the Benghazi incident that this was not the case. Instead, they
believed it was an attack coordinated by al-Qaeda and the Libyan group Ansar
al-Sharia.
Given the conflicting narrative produced by the Obama
Administration, there are two possible explanations. One possibility is that
officials within the White House were uninformed, meaning communication with
the State Department was woefully lacking. The other is that individuals within
the White House consciously and deliberately promoted a public explanation of
the Benghazi attack that was at odds with reality.
Vulnerabilities Found by Government Investigators
Long before the Benghazi
attack, in November 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report detailing U.S.
diplomatic security challenges. The report found three specific areas of
concern: (1) a greater number of missions in dangerous locations; (2)
insufficient and inexperienced staffing and inadequate building security, and
(3) a lack of strategic planning in diplomatic security.
According to the GAO report, maintaining missions in
increasingly dangerous locations had stretched the State Department’s ability
to provide adequate security. The GAO found that the State Department was
maintaining missions where it previously would have evacuated personnel or
closed the post. Missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other unstable nations
required “unprecedented amounts of security resources.”
[36] For example, diplomatic security
agents in Afghanistan and Iraq reported that safely transporting diplomatic
officials was their greatest challenge due to the assets required. These
include armored vehicles, contractors to maintain equipment in rough terrain,
and in some cases an air wing for transportation, surveillance, and search and
rescue operations
[37]
The GAO found that the State Department was maintaining
missions where it previously would have evacuated personnel or closed the post.
The GAO also found serious challenges with security staffing
and maintaining adequate building security. In 2008, around one-third of the
State Department’s domestic security offices operated with a vacancy rate of 25
percent or higher, with some offices operating at as low as 35 percent capacity
[38] When GAO staffers visited three
posts overseas, for example, they found that the Regional Security Office in
Abuja, Nigeria, had only one of four assigned security staff members while the
office in New Delhi “had only two of its seven allocated special agents until
fall of 2008.”
While the State Department tried to hire more special
agents, it takes three or more years to train these agents, even after the
State Department condensed agent training. Unfortunately, the pressing need for
agents ultimately led to 34 percent of security positions being “filled with
officer below the positions grade,” with such experience gaps threatening to
compromise diplomatic security
[39] The GAO also found that “many
buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack” due to a failure
to meet embassy security standards
[40]
Lastly, diplomatic security growth has been reactive, not
strategic. While security will always be partially reactive, planning ahead is
critical to ensure that staffing and resource priorities are met. The GAO
found:
Past efforts to further plan Diplomatic Security resources
have gone unheeded. Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan for fiscal year
2006 (written in 2005) identified a need to (1) develop a workforce strategy to
recruit and sustain a diverse and highly skilled security personnel base and
(2) to establish a training float to address recurring staffing problems. As of
September 2009, Diplomatic Security had not addressed either of those needs
[41]
Many of these gaps still remain today.
In a hearing on
November
15, 2012, the GAO stated that it had found that the State
Department still “needs to take action in order to strategically assess the
competing demands on Diplomatic Security and the resulting mission
implications.”
[42] Failure to remedy these concerns
led to serious diplomatic security vulnerabilities at posts throughout the
world, and will continue to do so unless they are addressed.
The Future of Diplomatic Security
The attack in Benghazi
and the most recent attack in Turkey
on February 1 represent only the latest incidents in which the security of U.S.
diplomatic missions was breached. The tragic loss of life that resulted from
these incidents should not serve simply as a reminder of the many dangers
facing U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. They should also act as a clarion call
for improving the standards by which diplomatic security is assessed and
implemented.
The U.S. State Department currently manages more than 200
posts throughout the world
[43] Most of these diplomatic
installations require unremarkable security needs. However, many of the
United
States’ most sensitive diplomatic missions
operate in tenuous security environments. It is in these areas that one most
often finds the need for enhanced security measures.
The findings from the ARB and HSGAC reports, and the fact
that many of the most important questions failed to receive adequate scrutiny,
should motivate action. Congress and the Administration should take the
following steps to anticipate and mitigate the omnipresent threats facing the
nation’s diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad:
Establish a Congressional Select Committee to find answers
to remaining questions. Questions still remain after the release of the
ARB and HSGAC reports, along with the related committee hearings, briefings,
and letters to Administration officials. These various investigations have not
only failed to provide complete answers to some of the crucial questions on
embassy security and the events of September 11, 2012, but have at times
resulted in contrasting and confusing accounts. There is historical precedent
for the formation of congressional select committees in the aftermath of
similar security crises—such as the Senate’s Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities in response to the Watergate scandal, and the joint
congressional committee that was established to investigate the Iran–Contra
affair. Such a committee would not only help to provide answers to the
remaining questions surrounding the attack, but would enable the relevant
congressional committees to work together to ensure the future safety of U.S.
diplomatic facilities abroad.
Recognize the true nature and scope of the Islamist
terrorist threat. Time and time again the Administration has failed to
recognize the true threat posed by Islamist extremism. In the days immediately
following the attack in Benghazi,
the Administration failed to identify the assault as an act of terrorism,
instead publicly subscribing to the belief that the attacks were born of a
spontaneous riot. Not only does this show that the Administration may have
failed to appropriately connect the dots following the attack, but also that it
is continues to fail to grasp the ideological motivations of Islamist
terrorists. So, too, it appears that the intelligence community may have failed
to identify warnings of the attack due to its narrow focus largely on al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, excluding groups not directly affiliated with al-Qaeda. In
order to better protect U.S.
interests in the future, both the Administration and the intelligence community
must recognize that while Osama Bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda, its affiliates,
and other Islamist extremists continue to actively plot to harm the United
States, its interests, and its citizens.
Conduct frequent and extensive threat assessments for
diplomatic facilities. Such assessments should be made for any and all
potential dangers, both anticipated and unanticipated, that could confront any
diplomatic mission—especially those operating in high-threat environments.
These threat assessments should include input from numerous agencies, including
the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Department,
and the State Department itself. The assessments should also include regular
briefings reaching the highest levels of both Congress and the White House. As
the ARB report highlighted, simply relying on “warning intelligence” is not
enough. Risk assessments that evaluate threats, criticality, and vulnerability,
along with a frank assessment of mission priorities, risks, and costs, should
be conducted on a regular basis and used to inform security decisions and resource
allocations.
Combat stovepiping in addressing diplomatic security and
ensure whole of government response. As previously stated, when a crisis
puts the lives of U.S.
personnel and U.S.
interests at risk, the whole of government should respond with all reasonably
available resources. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has testified that there
was not enough time to get armed assets to Benghazi
to aid in fending off the attack. Nevertheless, investigations have also
indicated that coordination between the Defense and State Departments on
matters of security were lacking. Similarly, while enough evidence existed to
suggest that the security situation in Benghazi
was deteriorating, it was not used to inform strategic decisions. This also
suggests a serious failure in communication and coordination. As the ARB report
asserted, security in Benghazi was
not recognized as a “shared responsibility” across the whole of government.
This must change. Greater effort is needed to combat such stove-piping in
addressing diplomatic security and ensure a government response to not only
ensure that other nation’s diplomatic facilities are secure, but also to allow
a swift response in the face of threats.
Assign a permanent Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Mediterranean. As
Libya and many
other Northern African nations remain politically unstable, it is necessary for
the U.S. to
deploy more robust, mobile, and flexible security forces in the region. The
U.S. Marine Corps should therefore permanently assign a Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) to the Mediterranean to provide this
capability. An MEU consists of roughly 2,200 Marines, three Navy amphibious
assault vessels, a rapidly deployable infantry battalion, and various aviation
assets. Because an MEU operates from Navy vessels, it can deploy relatively
large forces to a point of conflict rapidly, while not having the diplomatic
concerns of establishing a temporary base on foreign soil. A permanent MEU
presence in the Mediterranean will also enable a robust
force to evacuate U.S.
officials and citizens from an area of tumult quickly and with reduced risk of
harm.
Require that the investigations result in meaningful
legislative and executive branch follow-up. Too often, security breakdowns
are reported and recorded, and the recommendations are never implemented.
Congress should enact legislation that requires the State Department to submit
a follow-up report on Benghazi
within a year specifically addressing the progress made on implementing the
recommendations. It should also press the State Department to implement the
recommendations issued by the GAO.
Ensuring that Lessons Are Learned
The tragedy that took place in Benghazi
on September 11, 2012,
shocked and saddened the United States.
Both the State Department and the Senate tried to figure out what went wrong,
in hopes of ensuring that such a tragedy would not happen again. The State
Department’s Accountability Review Board and the Senate’s Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee released unclassified versions of their
findings. While many important issues were addressed, there remain glaring
omissions that still need to be addressed. In order to better protect U.S.
diplomatic facilities, these questions must be answered and a more focused and
effective holistic government approach created from the lessons demonstrated by
this possibly avoidable disaster.
—Scott G. Erickson is a police officer in California;
his focus is on identifying terrorist organizations. Jessica Zuckerman is
a Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center
for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, and Steven P. Bucci, PhD, is Director
of the Allison Center
for Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The authors wish to
thank Allison Center
intern Sarah Friesen for her help in preparing this paper.